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MIROSLAV ŠEDIVÝ
In their research on Ottoman history in the fi rst half of the 19th century, 
historians and orientalists exploited the archives in London and Paris or, 
particularly the Russians and Soviets, those in Russia not only relating to the 
diplomatic relations between the Sublime Porte and European countries but 
also for the mostly internal aff airs of the sultan’s empire. Surprisingly, only 
very few of them visited the Central European archives for the same purpose 
despite the fact that a considerable number of reports of Austrian and Prus-
sian diplomats residing within the Ottoman territory are particularly hou-
sed in Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in Vienna and Geheimes Staatsarchiv 
Preussischer Kulturbesitz in Berlin-Dahlem.1 
This approach seems to be logical at fi rst sight: Great Britain, Fran-
ce and Russia pursued an active policy in the Near East and their interests 
were much more excessive than those of Prussia. With a closer look, however, 
one realises that this dismissive approach is entirely unfounded in the case 
of Austria, which was connected with the Ottoman Empire by the longest 
frontier of all European countries as well as extensive political and econo-
mic interests; after the Napoleonic wars, the Habsburg Empire had the 
greatest share in its southeastern neighbour’s foreign trade until the 1840s. 
As to the second German Power, Prussian interests in the area were insigni-
fi cant, but owing to its important role on the chessboard of European diplo-
macy it could not ignore the events in the Levant and was also represented 
in Constantinople and some other places in the Near East.
1)  This study has been published as a part of the research project Metternich a Východní otáz-
ka 1821–1841 (Metternich and the Eastern Question 1821–1841) fi nanced by the Czech 
Science Foundation (GA ČR P410/10/P027).
Fall of Ancient Régime at Saint Domingue | Ivo Budil
and preferred to demonstrate the new effi  ciency of French royal army in 
Spain. The French interest in Saint Domingue died away.193  
The population of the independent island in 1824 divided into 
three political entities (the Kingdom of Henry Christophe I., the Southern 
Republic under Alexandre Pétion, and the Old Spanish District) was esti-
mated to be around 935,000 individuals.194 This mass was composed of 
blacks (819,000), mulattoes (105,000), Indians (1,500) and whites (500).195 The 
strikingly small number of whites was a result of the enforcement of the law 
of the new independent Haiti which declared that “no white man, whatever 
be his nationality, shall be permitted to land on the Haitian territory, with the 
title of master or proprietor; nor shall he be able, in future, to acquire there, 
either real estate or the rights of a Haitian”.196
The end of French hegemony at Saint Domingue and the emer-
gence of independent black state were enabled by defi ciencies of administra-
tion of the colony affl  icted by traditionally rivalry between the noblesse 
d´épée and the noblesse de robe. In 1789, the representatives of Saint Do-
mingue were trying to be integrated into National Assembly, without reali-
zing that the declaration of human rights and civic emancipation would be 
aimed at the very foundation of the island economic and social system. The 
resilience against the revolutionary impulses emanating from the continen-
tal France and an attempt to cope with the inner political confl icts and mu-
latto and slave uprising led to a tentative to create a new independent natio-
nal and political entity – nation haïtienne. However, this collective identity 
lacked a suffi  cient social background. If petits blacks succeeded in this pro-
ject, the result could have been a political system of racial apartheid not dis-
similar to the experiment in South Africa. Paradoxically, the dream of petits 
blancs on the independent nation haïtienne was realized later by the diff e-
rent people detested and hated by whites – liberated black slaves led by Tous-
saint Louverture and Jacques Dessalines.
193)  Christopher L. MILLER, Forget Haiti: Baron Roger and the New Africa. In: Yale French 
Studies, 107, 2005, p. 39–69.
194)  John Relly Beard thought that this census was highly exaggerated or falsifi ed. He was 
convinced that “at no time since its independence has Hayti proper – the French part – had 
more than from 500,000 to 600,000 inhabitants” – see BEARD, p. 20. 
195)  Ibid., p. 20. 
196)  Ibid., p. 20–21.
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my in Vienna founded by Maria Therese in the mid-18th century. Though men 
educated in Oriental languages and customs also worked in the agencies of 
other countries, the diff erence lay in the fact that in the period under re-
search the internunciature was also led by diplomats who studied at the Ori-
ental Academy and served in Constantinople in their youth. One example is 
Bartolomäus Baron von Stürmer, the son of another Internuncio Ignaz Lorenz 
von Stürmer, who was even born in the Ottoman capital and spent his child-
hood there. Afterwards, he moved to Vienna to study at the Academy and re-
turned for some time to Constantinople to practice. Consequently, when Stür-
mer junior, and other Austrian diplomats as well, took charge of their duties 
in the Levant, they not only had the relevant education but also the experi-
ence with a region that was not for them as alien and incomprehensible as it 
could be for career diplomats of other countries sent to the Levant without 
the knowledge of local languages and customs. Consequently, Stürmer was in 
a position to be a better observer of events than, for example, French Ambas-
sador Albin-Rein Baron Roussin or his British colleague John Lord Ponsonby. 
I do not want to claim at all that Stürmer’s reports were necessarily more ac-
curate than those written by other members of the diplomatic corps. Never-
theless, one can presume that owing to his childhood and youth spent in 
Constantinople, Stürmer could better understand the local specifi cs and was 
less likely to assess the developments in the Levant according to the stereoty-
pes of European civilization. The content of his dispatches acknowledges the 
correctness of this supposition to a certain degree.
As for the area covered by the Austrian and Prussian reports, their 
authors did not limit themselves to the diplomatic relations between the Otto-
man Empire and Europe but also described the internal conditions of the for-
mer; however, it is true that sometimes the line between internal and external 
aff airs was not very clear because many of what began as purely internal mat-
ters soon became a part of international relations owing to the interference of 
foreign states. From the themes described by Austrian and Prussian diplomats 
these can be named as an example: the printing of Ottoman newspapers or 
paper money, the sending of Ottoman students to Europe, the foundation of 
military schools, the relations among the Ottoman dignitaries, or the coexi-
stence among religious groups. The internuncios, during the period under 
research Franz Freiherr von Ottenfels before 1833 and the already named 
Bartolomäus Baron Stürmer afterwards, generally paid more attention to Ori-
ental events than the Prussian envoys, Alexander Freiherr von Miltitz before 
1828, Karl Wilhelm Freiherr von Canitz und Dallwitz from 1828 to 1829, Ca-
mille Royer de Luynes between 1829 and 1830, Friedrich Freiherr von Mar-
Consequently, it is possible to fi nd in Berlin as well as in Vienna 
perfectly ordered documents from various Ottoman regions: the reports of 
the representatives and their subalterns in Constantinople and likewise 
those of the employees of the consulates in Ottoman provinces. There are 
naturally also housed various private and offi  cial letters written by citizens 
of other states residing in the Levant, which were obtained in “diff erent 
ways” by both Central European Powers. Moreover, in contrast to a similar 
collection in Archives du Ministère belge des Aff aires etrangéres – Archives 
diplomatiques in Brussels where, at least until 1841, only a fragment of the 
original reports from the Ottoman Empire has been preserved, in the above 
mentioned archives in Vienna and Berlin the number of missing documents 
is relatively small.
The signifi cance of the Austrian and Prussian Oriental correspon-
dence did not only lie in the fact that it served as a basis for the decision 
making of the cabinets in Vienna and Berlin in their Near Eastern policy. 
Information was also transmitted to German newspapers and simultaneous-
ly other German courts if it was required. The most interested was the one in 
Munich because the Wittelsbach family had its prince in Athens and hoped 
to increase the Bavarian economy through commercial expansion on the 
Eastern markets via the Danube. Before the foundation of the Bavarian agen-
cy in Constantinople, the most important source of information were the 
Bavarian envoys in Vienna who, with Chancellor Metternich’s approval, 
transmitted news contained in the Austrian diplomatic correspondence and 
the views of Austrian diplomats and orientalists with whom they talked of 
the political, economic, military, religious and social matters concerning 
the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, owing to their inferiority in the diplomatic 
corps and little participation in the discussions over great diplomatic af-
fairs, the Bavarian diplomats in Vienna had enough time to write about the 
matters of less importance that were usually omitted in the reports of French 
or British ambassadors: for example the character of the Ottoman embassy 
in Vienna and its employees. The relevant documents housed in Bayerisches 
Hauptstaatsarchiv in Munich have also remained unresearched. 
It is defi nitely true that the Austrian and Prussian reports from 
Constantinople are a secondary source of information, at least in comparison 
with the content of Turkish and Egyptian archives. Nevertheless, in the case 
of the correspondence housed in the Austrian capital, one must refer to the 
fact that their authors were often not people entirely lost in a culturally diff e-
rent milieu. The internunciature and consulates of the Habsburg Empire 
were mostly occupied by the graduates from the well-known Oriental Acade-
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of June 1826 in an Egyptian style suit.2 The Austrian and Prussian represen-
tatives in Constantinople knew well about the monarch’s wish to create a re-
gular army already before this “benefi cial event,”3 but the radical measure 
which opened the way towards this goal was entirely unexpected for them. 
However, they immediately understood the signifi cance of this important 
step announcing “a new era in the annals of the Ottoman Empire,”4 which 
could and was to be fi lled with the changes necessary for the modernization 
of the country. They did not doubt its “enormous benefi cial eff ect”5 because 
they were persuaded that the corps of Janissaries caused “the misfortune of 
this Empire and retarded its civilization during the centuries.”6
The Ottoman ruler hoped to achieve Mohammed Ali’s attainments 
in the land on the Nile or those of Peter I the Great, whom he much admired,7 
in Russia a century earlier. He had in common with them the necessity to 
overcome the opposition of military elites and, like the former after the de-
struction of the Mamluks and the latter after the suppression of the Streltsy, 
Mahmud II, after discharging his own “praetorian guard”, turned his atten-
tion to Europe, where he wanted to gain inspiration for the reconstruction 
of his weak Empire. Nevertheless, he fell behind both the men he admired in 
the results. He certainly had a sincere aspiration to renew the bygone splend-
our of the Ottoman Empire and he was an intelligent man with an interest 
in the technological progress of the West, which was manifested, for examp-
le, by his greater pleasure at presents like globes, the models of fortresses, 
leather teams for the battery horses or military musical instruments rather 
than gifts usually sent like luxurious fabrics or porcelain,8 but he lacked 
a better knowledge of the situation in Europe, which he had never visited in 
2)  Miltitz to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 25. 6. 1826, Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussis-
cher Kulturbesitz, Berlin (henceforth: GStA PK), HA III, Ministerium des Auswärtigen I 
(henceforth: MdA I), 7262.
3)  Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 10. 6. 1826, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Wien 
(henceforth: HHStA), Staatenabteilungen (henceforth: StA), Türkei VI, 25.
4)  Miltitz to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 23. 6. 1826, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7262.
5)  Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 22. 6. 1826, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 25.
6)  Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 26. 6. 1826, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 25.
7)  Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 26. 8. 1835, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 
7276.
8)  Martens to Frederick William III, Constantinople, 31. 12. 1832, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 
7272.
tens from 1831 to 1835, and fi nally Hans Graf von Königsmarck after 1835, 
which surely resulted from greater Austrian involvement and Metternich’s 
extraordinary interest in the Near Eastern aff airs. 
The Austrian, Prussian and eventually Bavarian diplomats’ reports 
have an interesting common trait: the positive attitude towards the Ottoman 
Empire caused by their personal conservative thinking as well as their go-
vernments’ opinion of the necessity to preserve the sultan’s state for the main-
tenance of the European balance of power. This attitude was also shared by 
Austrian prominent orientalists, for example Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall 
or Anton Prokesch von Osten, and the members of the House of Habsburg like 
Archduke Johann, who personally visited the Ottoman Empire in 1837. Re-
gardless of how much their sentiment towards the Levant was infl uenced by 
their own civilizing dogmas, they almost never attacked the Islamic faith and 
did not demand the spread of Christianity in the Near East as did for examp-
le Alphonse de Lamartine, and they had a certain admiration for Ottoman 
society and its customs. These facts are evidenced in their assessments of Sul-
tan Mahmud II’s reformatory attempts that started after the dissolution of 
the Janissaries in June 1826 and lasted until this monarch’s death 13 years 
later. The opinions of Austrian, Prussian and Bavarian diplomats were sur-
prisingly concordant in this respect, as it will be generally manifested below. 
However, the purpose of this paper is not to give full evidence of the attitude 
of the Central Europe towards the Ottoman reform movement in the 1820s 
and 1830s but only through a brief analysis of this phenomenon to draw at-
tention to a surprising omission of information resources housed in some 
Central European archives and simultaneously to the little research that has 
been done on the relations between the Central European region and the Ot-
toman Empire in the fi rst half of the 19th century. Since the relevant docu-
ments are usually entirely unknown, I fi nd it necessary to quote sometimes 
longer extracts to give evidence for their authors’ judgement. 
Mahmud II started his reforms immediately after the elimination 
of the conservative military force whose weakness became evident in its 
battles with the Greek rebels. The sultan wanted to create a new regular 
army and follow the example of his powerful Egyptian Governor Moham-
med Ali whose forces showed great combat effi  ciency in the Peloponnese. 
This Egyptian infl uence on the Ottoman court was clearly evident through 
the fact that Mahmud II watched the fi rst parade of his new troops at the end 
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General Lieutenant Count Osery, brother-in-law of Marshal Jean Victor Ma-
rie Moreau and a hero of the Napoleonic wars in which he lost an arm,13 and 
who stayed in Constantinople in the late 1820s and discussed the conditions 
of the Ottoman armed forces with Ottenfels. He was very critical and, for 
example, he could not understand why by that time the good Ottoman caval-
ry had been changed according to the European model and had thus lost 
many of its characteristics that had made this component of the sultan’s 
army earlier a respected enemy even among the Cossacks: “The Turkish ca-
valry was one of the best units of the Ottoman Empire; it always was superior 
to the Russian cavalry; what it lacked was good direction and to be employed 
in an appropriate way. Instead of leaving it as it was and adding brave and 
intelligent offi  cers who would know how to lead it into combat where it could 
off er useful and decisive service, attempts have been made to transform it into 
a European cavalry and to replace their [the Ottomans’] saddles in the Turkish 
or Cossack style to which they have been accustomed since their childhood 
with saddles of European style with stirrups in which they do not know how to 
remain seated.”14 Osery saw the main problem not in the sultan’s lack of will 
but his ignorance: “Sultan Mahmud possesses character, capacity and he 
would like to institute reforms and do good, but neither he himself nor his re-
tinue can discover where they are needed. This ignorance causes one to attach 
too much importance to the secondary objects and neglect the essential. One 
believes much has been accomplished through the creation of regiments, 
guards, columns, and giving them uniforms and brass bands and having 
them march in the training camps. But one forgets that the enemy advances 
with forces and it is crucial to halt and defeat it.”15
Osery’s words about Mahmud II’s liking for the form but little 
understanding of the content are often repeated in the reports written by 
the Prussian and Austrian representatives who generally criticised the sul-
tan for a certain level of superfi ciality in his reform of the state apparatus 
and the army. Stürmer was convinced that “all innovations are superfi cial 
and in no way aff ect the disorder at its root, and being more child’s play than 
real progress according to European civilization, they will necessarily have 
13)  Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, 3. 4. 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 39.
14)  Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 14. 5. 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 37.
15)  Ibid.
contrast to Peter the Great. This probably explains why he did not under-
stand the real reasons for the technological and economic superiority of the 
West over the Levant and, according to German speaking diplomats, he pre-
sumed that it would be suffi  cient to adopt some of the achievements of the 
European countries without regard for the diff erent conditions of Ottoman 
society in order to overcome the enormous diff erences between the two 
worlds.9 As the Austrian and Prussian diplomats concluded, this led to 
a headlong westernalization often manifesting itself through the adoption 
of entirely unnecessary and pointless measures like the orders concerning 
the implementation of European-style clothing or the shortening of traditio-
nal long male beards, which were regarded by the sultan as old fashioned, 
and therefore could not reach more than two inches below the chin, or that 
a moustache could not be wider than the eyebrows.10 When Mahmud II fell 
ill in June 1839, the Austrians and Prussians did not leave unnoticed the 
fact that his serious condition was considerably deteriorated by a vice taken 
from the West: inebriety.11
The blind implementation of Western patterns by Mahmud II, as 
the Prussians and Austrians generally regarded his reformatory attempts, 
was in fact an attempt to build on sand a house whose foundations were 
further weakened with the sultan’s impatience, in other words his wish to 
see the results of his reformatory eff ort during his life. This eagerness can be 
understood to a certain extent to be owing to his desire to promptly halt the 
blows that the Empire had suff ered in the recent years. On the one hand, it 
had positive eff ects when a considerable number of benefi cial changes oc-
curred in a short time after 1826.12 On the other hand, it led to measures that 
were not only pointless as noted above but also counterproductive, as for 
example in the army where the attempts to come closer to the West brought 
changes that did not meet with the approval of European experts like French 
9)  Anton von PROKESCH-OSTEN, Über die dermaligen Reformen im türkischen Reiche, 1832, in 
Kleine Schriften, Band V, Stuttgart 1844, p. 401.
10)  Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 5. 10. 1836, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 
7278; Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 4. and 11. 1. 1837, GStA PK, HA 
III, MdA I, 7279; Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 18. 1. 1837, HHStA, StA, Türkei 
VI, 66.
11)  Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 18., 20., 24. and 26. 6. 1839, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 
69; Bockelberg to Frederick William III, Vienna, 30. 6. 1839, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7346.
12)  Stiepovich [?] to Royer, Pera, 22. 6. 1829, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7267.
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things [and] manifest themselves at every step; they are revealed in the huge 
wooden edifi ces that he [Mahmud II] orders to be constructed and that when 
fi nished fall into ruin, in the fl eet anchored along the Bosphorus where it rots 
but responds to salutes when shown in public, an ostentation that Admiral 
Roussin indicated to me last year [1836] as a luxury that France or England 
would not be rich enough to aff ord. It is necessary to say how little Sultan Mah-
mud comes close to Peter the Great with whom he likes to be compared when 
one sees that during the repairs to the fortifi cation on the Bosphorus he had 
the walls whitened and crowned with wooden towers on which an immense 
fl ag with the imperial insignia was raised, that the parades of his troops about 
which the offi  cial newspaper informs from time to time consist of him eating 
and drinking in the barracks with his favourites, expecting that the soldiers 
under the windows will fi re a quantity of powder to make the maximum noise, 
and that the visits to the sites have no other purpose than for him to enjoy the 
spectacle which is off ered by a ship that is launched for the fi rst time at sea.”19
The impact of Mahmud II’s personal defi ciencies probably would 
not have been so serious if he had been surrounded by capable advisors who 
would have undertaken the obligations for pursuing reforms. However, this 
was not the case. As Ottenfels wrote in July 1832: “This is not at all the time 
when Sultan Mahmud can hope to realise the project [of reforms]. His intenti-
ons are certainly laudable and one cannot praise enough the determination 
and perseverance with which he follows his goal. But this sovereign himself is 
largely inerudite and surrounded by advisors who are too ignorant and too 
interested in fl attering him and hiding the truth to know which proper means 
he ought to choose for implementing his ideas.”20
The most signifi cant personality among the Ottoman dignitaries 
in the period under research certainly was Husrev Pasha, who perfectly per-
sonifi ed the negative factors hampering the reformatory process.21 The Au-
strian and Prussian diplomats did not deny his intelligence, fi nesse and re-
19)  Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 4. 1. 1837, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 
7279.
20)  Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 10. 7. 1832, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 54; Two mon-
ths later he expressed this opinion again: “Mahmud wants to do good, but he lacks capable 
subjects who could realize his plans.” Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 10. 9. 1832, 
HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 54.
21)  Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 26. 6. 1839, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 
7281.
to collapse sooner or later.”16 Königsmarck entirely shared this opinion, 
which is among other ways evidenced by his ironical appraisal of the re-
forms made in 1836: “Everything that has been done during the last year 
[for the Ottoman Empire] to come closer to Europe and civilize itself is limited 
more or less to the change of the titles Reis Efendi and Kiaya Bey to those of 
the ministers of foreign aff airs and interior, with the elevation of their hol-
ders to the rank of pasha; placement of the sultan’s portrait in the barracks 
and the palaces of the admiralty, the Serasker and the Porte; the nominal 
division of the Empire into six Mouchiriats (military commands) with the 
aim to create a militia; the construction of a bridge between Constantinople 
and Galata that had to be designated under the denomination ‘benefaction 
of Sultan Mahmud’ in order [for those responsible] not to be penalized; the 
permission given to the pashas and the prominent dignitaries to travel in 
a coach with four horses, and the ministers of the second and third class and 
Ulemas to travel in a coach with two horses; fi nally, the mintage of coins with 
the sultan’s portrait but which no one has yet dared to put into circulation 
and of which several pieces should be distributed among the companions of 
His Highness to judge through their reaction the eff ect which would be pro-
duced in the public by this innovation contradictory to the religious dogmas 
that would be pointlessly violated again.”17
As to the changes carried out in the Ottoman armed forces, Mah-
mud II only vaguely understood the art of warfare because he never led his 
soldiers in battle, for which he compensated with a taste for manoeuvres and 
parades. One cannot wonder that he was interested more in uniforms than 
in the practical skills of his soldiers and, consequently, the military band 
seemed to be the best trained part of the army, at least in 1829, but this troop 
never decides battles.18 This preference for the form sometimes reached ab-
surd proportions. Königsmarck also negatively assessed the sultan’s actions 
doing in this regard: “The personal vanity of the sultan, his weak character 
and his superfi cial knowledge attach more to the form than to the substance of 
16)  Stürmer declared this statement in his discussion with his Prussian colleague, see König-
smarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 25. 11. 1835, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7276. The 
Prussian envoy entirely agreed as evidence in Königsmarck to Frederick William III, 
Büyükdere, 5. 10. 1836, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7278.
17)  Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 4. 1. 1837, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 
7279.
18)  Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 14. 5. 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 37.
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Husrev Pasha was no adherent of radical changes in Ottoman so-
ciety but he did not oppose the reforms in the army of which he was in char-
ge from 1827 to 1837 as its commander-in-chief (Serasker), and he could also 
aff ect its form since March 1838 when he became president of the supreme 
counsel.28 His rather dubious help in the improvement in the Ottoman ar-
med forces was described by Osery in 1829: “Serasker Husrev Pasha, who is 
after the sultan the soul of the military reforms, is the greatest comedian and 
charlatan of the Empire. He is not lacking in intelligence but it is not that of 
a statesman or a general of armies; it is the slyness of a false-hearted courte-
san that is almost exclusively employed for the fl attering of the sultan’s aff ec-
tion to conserve the infl uence that he has gained at the court. It is he who con-
tinually suggests new projects to his sovereign, but since he has neither the 
relevant education nor the range of vision to be able to distinguish what is 
really great, useful and urgent from what is illusory, secondary and futile, he 
very often leads the sultan from the right path and encourages his whims. In-
stead of inducing him to create and improve what could be really useful in the 
war, he persuades him to spend enormous sums on fantastical clothes of his 
guards, on the musical instruments and on other objects good in time of peace 
and in the place for parade.”29 
This view was supported by the statements of the Central Euro-
pean diplomats, among them also by Baron Königsmarck who wrote 7 years 
later: “In all seasons and in all weather he [Husrev Pasha] is seen browsing 
around Constantinople, the Bosphorus and its environs, in a boat, on a horse, 
in a coach, on foot; he is everywhere and he meddles with everything. But with 
all this activity he only dabbles in the matters without investigating any; he 
starts everything but he fi nishes nothing. A skilful courtier, he would always 
like to have something new and pleasant to tell his master, to propound sever-
al new inventions to him, to propose ameliorations in the military organisati-
on or the civil administration, but he immediately abandons his projects, 
some of them even sage and benefi cial, as soon as he notices that they no more 
amuse the fi ckle humour of His Highness. The Serasker seriously cares only for 
topics that fl atter the vanity of the sultan.”30
28)  Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 5. 9. 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 37; Königs-
marck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 28. 3. 1838, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7279.
29)  Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 14. 5. 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 37.
30)  Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 19. 10. 1836, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 
7278.
markable vigour with regard to his advanced years, but they also jointly and 
not unjustly accredited mendacity, cowardice and villainy to him;22 Miltitz 
even considered him to be “the most two-faced, the most contemptible and the 
greatest traitor of his nation.”23 It is no surprise that Husrev enjoyed no con-
fi dence among the German-speaking diplomats and not only did none of 
them regret his downfall and banishment in Rodosto in the summer of 1840, 
almost a year after Mahmud II’s death, but the defi nitive removal of this man 
from the state aff airs was also regarded as a very fortunate event.24
The reason for this attitude did not only lie in the revulsion to-
wards Husrev’s character but also in his negative impact on the reformatory 
eff ort of his master. The main interest of this “Ottoman Talleyrand” was to 
stay in his monarch’s favour at any price,25 and he was really rather suc-
cessful in this eff ort. In 1836, he had been a pasha with three tails for 35 
years, which was an incredible performance in such an unstable social mi-
lieu. However, this success was not particularly achieved by meritorious 
work to the benefi t of the Empire but through intrigues against his oppon-
ents, which was anybody who could limit his own power,26 and through an 
unceasing desire to attract the attention of all sultans he served, often not 
with important but petty matters making his masters happy. In other words, 
not the welfare of the Empire but his personal profi t was the principal object 
of his deeds.27 
22)  Miltitz to Frederick William III, Pera, 10. 2. 1827, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7264; Ottenfels 
to Metternich, Constantinople, 10. 5. 1830, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 50.
23)  Miltitz to Frederick William III, Pera, 10. 5. 1823, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7257; Stürmer to 
Metternich, Constantinople, 30. 3. 1833, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 57.
24)  Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 10. 6. and 16. 7. 1840, GStA PK, HA III, 
MdA I, 7282; Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 6. and 10. 6., 16. 7. 1840, HHStA, 
StA, Türkei VI, 74; Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 6. 8. 1840, HHStA, StA, Tür-
kei VI, 75.
25)  Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 10. 5. 1830, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 50; Stiepovich 
[?] to Royer, Pera, 22. 6. 1829, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7267; Königsmarck to Frederick Wil-
liam III, Büyükdere, 26. 6. 1839, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7281.
26)  Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 14. 5. 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 37; Königs-
marck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 19. 10. 1836, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7278.
27)  Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 19. 10. 1836, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 
7278; Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 14. 5. 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 37; Ot-
tenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 10. 5. 1830, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 50.
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of their reluctance or incapacity.37 The rise of talented men was aggravated 
by corruption and the struggle for power, and when someone competent was 
fi nally found despite these obstructions, he inevitably became a part of 
a contest for power which was in progress between diff erent interest groups, 
and he sooner or later fell into disfavour with his monarch, who was thus 
cutting a tree on which he tried to climb.38 This situation was accurately de-
scribed by Königsmarck in the spring of 1838: “They [reforms] do not pursue 
a fi xed and determined aim but change direction in every moment according 
to personal ideas and views of the individual advisors. And exactly at the mo-
ment when a minister seizes with a certain force the reins of the government, 
a hundred people try to discredit him in the eyes of the sovereign whose suspi-
cion can be raised very easily if one of his servants gains any infl uence. The 
sultan’s favour substitutes for merit and with this favour his subject obtains or 
loses a position, fortune or consideration. Therefore, there are intrigues to ob-
tain and conserve the favour and that is why mistrust and jealousy dominate 
between the employees; a smile of the master suffi  ces for making an adversary 
of a so-called friend.”39 
The hope for the improvement in this respect arose at the end of 
Mahmud II’s reign in the personality of Pertev’s protégé, Mustafa Reshid Pa-
sha, who was nominated the minister of foreign aff airs in June 1837. Despite 
his obvious aff ection for the liberal Powers, Stürmer and Königsmarck 
judged him positively and appreciated his extraordinary intelligence, out-
look and sincere wish to regenerate the Ottoman Empire. Their confi dence 
in this man proved to be well-founded after Mahmud II’s death.40
When Mahmud II overcame the ineff ectiveness of his administra-
tion, his reforms were often met with incomprehension on the part of the 
Ottoman society that was not excited by the considerable number of chan-
ges established in a short time. And though the conservative forces had lost 
with the Janissaries the power to resist the sultan’s reformatory zeal, scant 
37)  Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 6. 11. 1839, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 
7281.
38)  Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 8. 8. 1838, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 
7280.
39)  Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 4. 4. 1838, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 
7280.
40)  Stürmer to Metternich, Büyükdere, 14. 4. 1837, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 66; Königsmarck to 
Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 9. 5. and 8. 8. 1838, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7280.
Husrev’s most dangerous rival was Pertev Pasha, a high Ottoman 
functionary with extraordinary intelligence, education and ability to con-
trol the aff airs of state little seen in the Levant,31 according to Ottenfels even 
“undoubtedly the most learned and capable man among the Turks to direct 
a ministry.”32 On the other hand, the Austrian and Prussian diplomats could 
not deny his vanity, religious sentiment bordering on fanaticism and his 
aversion to Europeans33 which led to his opposition against the reforms in 
European style. That Stürmer praised Pertev for this fact is evident from his 
retroactive assessment: “He [Pertev] was not at all the enemy of reform as it is 
commonly thought but he wanted to get to the heart of the matter and not just 
its surface.”34 The long-term struggle for power with Husrev Pasha ended 
with Pertev’s fall and forced exile in Adrianople in September 1837 and 
death in November of the same year. This outcome was generally regretted, 
which is, however, somehow surprising in the case of the Austrians who had 
some disputes with him.35 Nevertheless, Stürmer reacted to the news of his 
death with this statement: “As long as Pertev lived, the evil was reparable; to-
day it is without remedy.”36
The loss of competent men was a luxury that Mahmud II defi nitely 
could not aff ord. He suff ered from a critical lack of intelligent and educated 
advisors who would support his unsteady throne and his reformatory eff ort. 
The sultan was generally surrounded by minions with whom he could hard-
ly proceed; he declared his wishes to improve the situation of the Empire 
several times during his reign and gathered men to prepare new law-books, 
but those who were charged with the realisation of his wishes failed because 
31)  Brassier to Frederick William III, Pera, 26. 3. 1831, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7270.
32)  Lerchenfeld to Ludwig I von Bayern, Vienna, 10. 10. and 12. 12. 1837, Bayerisches Haupt-
staatsarchiv in Munich (henceforth: BHStA), Ministerium des Äußern (henceforth: MA), 
Wien 2407.
33)  Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 19. 10. 1836, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 
7278; Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 13. 9. 1837, GStA PK, HA III, MdA 
I, 7279; Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 8. 4. 1835, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 63.
34)  Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 15. 11. 1837, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 66.
35)  Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 13. and 20. 9., 15. 11. 1837, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 
66; Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 15. 11. 1837, GStA PK, HA III, MdA 
I, 7279
36)  Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 15. 11. 1837, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 66.
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of the inhabitants to take part in the reformatory process they usually did 
not understand and their lack of will to face hard knocks, as was proved at 
times of jeopardy. The Ottomans showed almost no willingness to defend the 
capital when the Russians or Egyptians were practically knocking at its 
gates, the former in 1829, the latter twice in the 1830s. In these diffi  cult si-
tuations, general apathy prevailed among them, between commoners as well 
as the elite, and the sultan could not count upon their patriotism that would 
support his unsteady throne.45
In late August 1829, a total dissolution reigned in the Ottoman 
army; neither the rest of regular forces nor the hastily gathered militia were 
willing to fi ght. Most of 20 000 defenders of Adrianople threw down their 
arms and called for peace, and their commander had no other choice than to 
surrender the city, once the residence of the Ottoman sultans, without gi-
ving battle to the Russians.46 Several years later, during the war with Mo-
hammed Ali, the situation in Constantinople was no better and a general 
apathy prevailed among its inhabitants; almost no one was prepared to risk 
his life for his monarch.47 The Prussian envoy sent a rather pessimistic re-
port on the said situation of the Ottoman Empire to Berlin in late March 
1833: “The sultan, the Seraglio, the Divan, the Ministry, the Ulemas, the people 
– Turkish, Greek and Armenian, nothing hangs together, no one even gives 
a hand to help each other and understands one another; nobody agrees with 
anything and a remarkable dissolution exists in all areas, in all elements of 
the state. One would be inclined to say we are stagnating here in a state of ba-
rely organised chaos; nowhere is there any energy, any measures, unity, judg-
ment, resolution. This is an ancient ruined edifi ce that hardly stands on its 
unsteady columns and seems to have lost its base… fi nally, the Ulemas start to 
say openly that it would be better to see and have Ibrahim [Mohammed Ali’s 
son] here than the sultan.”48 And he continued in this scepticism a few days 
later: “When one considers the general situation of the Porte, it is as deplorab-
le as it could be. Humiliation is everywhere, patriotism nowhere; there are no 
45)  Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 29. 8. 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 37; Ottenfels 
to Metternich, Constantinople, 10. 12. 1832, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 55; Martens to Frede-
rick William III, Büyükdere, 25. and 30. 3. April 23, 1833, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7272; 
Stürmer to Metternich, Büyükdere, 10. 7. 1839, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 69.
46)  Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 29. 8. 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 37.
47)  Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 10. 12. 1832, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 55.
48)  Martens to Frederick William III, Pera, 25. 3. 1833, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7272.
willingness of the inhabitants to accept the new order was often suffi  cient 
to hamper the reforms prepared by only a few members of the ruling elite. 
The opposition to the innovations is also evidenced by the reluctance recei-
ved by Mahmud II’s decision to have two of his children vaccinated by 
a French doctor, which, according to some Moslems, contradicted the doc-
trine of predestination.41
The question of the impact of the changes on the society probably 
was the most discussed topic in the letters of Austrian and Prussian citizens 
remaining within the Ottoman Empire. In compliance with their generally 
conservative thinking, they claimed that the reforms were to be implemen-
ted with the respect for traditions and customs of the Ottomans, and parti-
cularly with Islam that was for the majority a crucial bond with their ruler, 
whose authority sprang from his religious as well as his secular power. The 
Austrians and Prussians presumed that if the Islamic faith remained intact, 
there was still hope for salvation.42 However, the series of headlong changes 
were too revolutionary for the citizens, were not specifi ed in the reports wh-
ether for all or only the Moslems, and what was even worse, they were mostly 
incomprehensible. Moreover, for the adherents of the Prophet the behaviour 
of some prominent Ottoman dignitaries had to be at least strange, like that 
of those who disdained Moslem habits with their improper behaviour in se-
veral ways, for example by drinking too much champagne at the evening 
party held on the British warship Blonde on November 4, 1829.43 Royer sig-
hed that with such people close to the sultan at the head of state aff airs “the-
re is no prospect for the salvation of the country.”44
All of the Central European diplomats and orientalists enumera-
ted in the introduction to this paper saw the main problem of the Ottoman 
Empire not in the technological backwardness behind the West because this 
evil was reparable if the Ottomans were inclined to progress, but in the scant 
resolve of a society that was aff ected with a serious crisis. They shared the 
opinion that the poorly considered changes contributed to the violation of 
the links with the past and thus contributed to the Ottomans’ scant identi-
fi cation with their own state, that was “proved” by the negligible eagerness 
41)  Miltitz to Frederick William III, Pera, 25. 5. 1827, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7264.
42)  Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 25. 2. 1830, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 50.
43)  Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 10. 11. 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 37; Royer to 
Frederick William III, Pera, 5. 11. 1829, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7268.
44)  Royer to Frederick William III, Pera, 5. 11. 1829, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7268.
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in the society, even among the conservative bodies. In the spring of 1833 
Stürmer wrote: “When one warns the Turks of a revolution that could break 
out in consequence of the events of the day, they tell us: so much the better; we 
are going so wrong that we cannot but profi t from every kind of change.”55 One 
cannot wonder that even the Ottoman forces enjoyed little confi dence of 
their monarch, and sometimes they were not even sent against the enemy for 
fear of their desertion. This anxiety proved to be entirely justifi able in the 
summer of 1839 when a considerable part of the army did desert and almost 
the entire fl eet defected.56
In general, though the German-speaking diplomats sincerely desi-
red to see the regeneration of the Ottoman Empire, they never believed it 
very much, at times of war as well as peace. They also were not very certain 
of its long duration and although they did not believe in its imminent down-
fall, they considered its disorganization to be too general for the Empire to 
be saved from its defi nite doom in the future.57 However, at least Stürmer 
and Königsmarck maintained in the mid-1830s that the Porte possessed the 
means for the retardation of this progress. The latter after a discussion with 
the former wrote: “It is true that there are absolutely no material forces dis-
posable at this moment, but I see considerable resources in the richness of the 
soil, abundance of the mines not yet exploited, and the great morality of the 
Moslem inhabitants. A nation whose morals and customs are so little corrup-
ted, in which so great religiosity and probity exist, is capable of great things if 
it once awakes from its lethargy, particularly as the Koran gives latitude to 
the sovereign, who, if he had the force of character and attainments of Mo-
hammed Ali, could through this backing, as Mr Stürmer observes, indeed be-
come a regenerator of the Ottoman Empire. But as things are placed at pre-
sent, the zeal of the nation could probably be invoked more by the 
remembrance of the past and ancient institutions than by continuing with 
the innovations. The more I observe the Turks, the more I uncover their re-
semblance to the Spanish people from the interior of the [Spanish] kingdom, 
not to those from the towns on the sea coast who are poorly behaved and enti-
55)  Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 27. 3. 1833, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 57.
56)  Martens to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 25. 3. 1833, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7272; 
Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 27. 3. 1833, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 57; Stürmer to 
Metternich, Büyükdere, 8. 7. 1839, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 69.
57)  Martens to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 23. 4. 1833, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7272
supporters of the government; public opinion is always pronouncing against 
the Russians; there are insuffi  cient preparations in everything and everywhe-
re; there is a total lack of energy in this free-minded and degenerate nation; 
there are soldiers without experience and leaders without real courage; there 
is an enemy who seems to gain all hearts; there is disregard for the sovereign; 
there is a prime minister, a fi rst favourite (the Serasker), who, as well as the 
rest of the prominent employees, wants above all to retain his position, his 
richness, his infl uence. Which state with such elements could save itself?”49
The Austrian internuncio’s analysis written at the same moment 
carried itself in the same spirit,50 and the same despair can also be found in 
his reports sent to Vienna in 1839, when the Porte gradually lost its army, 
monarch and fl eet in the fi ght with Mohammed Ali. In Constantinople a uni-
versal desire for peace prevailed though it had to be expected that it would 
be redeemed by extensive concessions; the lower classes wanted it for fear of 
their existence, the members of the elite in the hope of preserving their of-
fi ces.51 In short “never were the Turks more depressed. They are beaten, con-
sternated, humiliated, and they even seem to abandon hope in the salvation of 
the Ottoman Empire.”52 According to Stürmer and other German speaking 
diplomats, this little faith in the long duration of the Empire was a symptom 
of the deep crisis of the state system and society and was also wide-spread 
among its members in peacetime when, for example, it used to happen that 
some old Ottomans stopped the Europeans in the streets and asked them 
how many years they gave to its existence, whether six, fi ve or even less.53
The sad situation of the Ottoman Empire is underlined by the fact 
that the government did not try very hard to change this fatalism for fear 
that with an attempt to raise the national enthusiasm it would lose the con-
trol over the course of events.54 The apprehension of its own people’s disloy-
alty was not baseless because in diffi  cult times, complaints about the point 
of any change at the top of the state apparatus including the ruler appeared 
49)  Martens to Frederick William III, Pera, 30. 3. 1833, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7272.
50)  Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 27. 3. 1833, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 57.
51)  Stürmer to Metternich, Büyükdere, 10. 7. 1839, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 69; Stürmer to Met-
ternich, Büyükdere, 28. 8. 1839, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 70.
52)  Stürmer to Metternich, Büyükdere, 22. 7. 1839, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 69.
53)  Bockelberg to Frederick William III, Vienna, 15. 1. 1839, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 6032; 
Stürmer to Metternich, Büyükdere, 22. 7. 1839, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 69.
54)  Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 31. 12. 1832, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 55.
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loved son is feeble, his other much-loved children are dead; and since no great 
minister came to second him and help to carry the load of his burdensome 
crown, he had to die before accomplishing the vast designs he planned to exe-
cute. Such was the career that he had to live through. History will not call him 
a great man but it will take into consideration what he did and what he wan-
ted to do, and on that account it will assign him a fi tting and noble place 
among the Mussulman princes.”62
62)  Stürmer to Metternich, Büyükdere, 1. 7. 1839, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 69.
rely corrupted through their contact with foreigners, and who in this compa-
rison seem to be the Greeks of Spain.”58
According to the Austrians and Prussians, Mahmud II’s changes in 
the administration and army usually met with little success. With the re-
forms that were labelled not only by Archduke Johann as “antinational”,59 
the old offi  ces were abolished and new institutions founded, but their effi  ci-
ency remained basically unchanged. As to the creation of the new army, in 
Königsmarck’s opinion “all reforms consist in disorganization and destruc-
tion, not in creation.”60 Upon discussions with leading offi  cials and the mem-
bers of the sultan’s family, Stürmer concluded at the end of Mahmud II’s 
reign that all the parts of the governmental machinery had been debased by 
the Ottoman sovereign and “since no great man is available, who would grip 
the government of the state with a fi rm hand and manage to reorganise all 
branches of the administration and inspire new zeal in the depressed spirits 
of the Mussulmans, nothing will be seen other than the decadence and fi nally 
the total ruin of the Ottoman Porte.”61
However, both representatives wished Mahmud II’s eff ort to im-
prove the internal situation of his country well, and they did not assess his 
personality entirely negatively; more likely they regarded him as an unfor-
tunate man who had become a puppet in the hands of fate. When the old 
sultan died at the turn of June and July 1839 and left his Empire on the ver-
ge of collapse in consequence of the instant and unsuccessful war with Mo-
hammed Ali, Stürmer’s evaluation of Mahmud II’s personality and actions 
was quite forbearing, as is evident from the internuncio’s hindsight which 
has the character of a fi tting epitaph: “All his life from the cradle was lined 
with misfortunes. His youth was a long prison, and acceding to the throne 
wholly imbrued with blood, he seemed to be seated so high only to be able to see 
better the ruin and dismemberment of the vast Empire governed by his ance-
stors. All his wars were in vain and all his appeals to the European sovereigns 
were refused or futile; revolt raised its hideous head everywhere and, not 
being strong enough to suppress it, he had to withdraw everywhere; his be-
58)  Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 25. 11. 1835, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 
7276.
59)  Lerchenfeld to Ludwig I von Bayern, Vienna, 31. 12. 1837, BHStA, MA, Wien 2407.
60)  Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 4. 1. 1837, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 
7279.
61)  Bockelberg to Frederick William III, Vienna, 15. 1. 1839, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 6032.
